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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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CHARACTER OF UNCIO CHARTER SHOULD ASSURE SUPPORT BY CONGRESS

THE settlement in Moscow, on June 22, of the controversy over composition of the Polish government, which had repeatedly threatened the unity of the Big Three, loomed more important in this week's headlines than the termination of the twomonths' United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco on June 26. Yet the two events are intimately related. For the deadlock over the Polish situation reached in April by the tripartite Moscow Commission might not have been broken so swiftly if the great powers concerned had not had the opportunity to canvass the world situation at leisure as they did at the UNCIO conference which reflected, as in a microcosm, the strains and stresses of post-war Europe. The Russians were able to observe at close range how their abrupt unilateral actions affect other peoples—even those most eager for friendship with the U.S.S.R. Western nations, for their part, learned at first hand the urgent reality of Russia's preoccupation with security against the renewal of German aggression. The conference itself, as it proceeded after an initial period charged with suspicion about the Soviet government's intentions, appears to have convinced Russia that other countries are determined to build an effective system of collective security with it, and not against it, as frequently suspected in Moscow.

It is this give and take—the slow, often tedious, almost always unglamorous process of mutual concession and compromise—that represents the greatest single achievement of San Francisco. The Big Four had been in a position to impose on other countries, by force if necessary, the concept of international organization they had previously embodied in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of October 9, 1944; and the Russians, unaccustomed at home to parliamentary debate, found it particularly difficult to understand the reason for submission of these pro-

posals to discussion, and even amendment, by small countries lacking military and industrial resources to wage war. Yet the great powers wisely recognized that a world order built without the voluntary cooperation of the small and middle nations would be built on sand.

ESSENCE OF DUMBARTON OAKS KEPT. The core of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals is retained essentially unaltered in the Charter of the United Nations. The principal organ—for the time being at least — is to be the Security Council, in which the Big Five will have permanent seats, and will be able to exercise a broad right of veto. It is a misapprehension to believe that Russia alone among the great powers insisted on retention of a strong veto power; for many Americans, including some of the members of the United States delegation, have taken the view that without provision for veto power the Senate might not ratify the Charter. The long and intensive debate about the veto concerned not the Big Five's veto on use of military force, but their right to veto discussion and investigation of controversies regarded as a threat to peace, especially when they are not involved in such controversies. Here again the difference of view between Russia, . on the one hand, and the Western powers on the other, can best be understood by bearing in mind that Russia has had little experience with the process of political debate, and is determined that the new organization should have as much authority centered in the Security Council as possible.

EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. At the same time, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals have been liberalized in five main respects, at the demand of the small and middle nations, backed by public opinion in Britain and the United States. First, a concerted effort was made to expand a document forged in time of war, and consequently focused on

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the task of averting future wars by the use of military force, into a document whose stated objectives are protection of human rights, defense of the dignity of the individual, and advancement of social and economic welfare. Peace, in other words, is to be not merely order imposed by force, but order based on justice. The cynic might murmur: "words, words, words." And it is obvious that, if there is no will on the part of the various nations to make the Charter work, the fine sentiments expressed in the preamble will prove so much waste paper. But this should only challenge us, and the peoples of other nations, to practice our ideals, not merely rehearse them in eloquent phrases. It is encouraging that determined pressure for inclusion of the concepts of justice and human welfare in the Charter was brought to bear on the United States delegation by consultants representing forty-two national organizations which had been invited by the State Department to present the views of their constituents. This experiment in establishing a link between public opinion and officials representing the people at an international conference proved so successful that it should be repeated at future gatherings—and extended to include public opinion representatives of the other United Nations.

ASSEMBLY'S DISCUSSION SCOPE BROAD-ENED. Second, the General Assembly, which under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was slated for a rubber-stamp role, is to become a forum for discussion of "any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter." The Assembly will be free. to consider any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, to bring any such question to the attention of the Security Council, and to make recommendations, provided the question is not at that time being considered by the Council. Here again the provisions of the Charter could remain a dead letter if the nations should be apathetic about using the General Assembly as their sounding-board. The lively debates over the veto power, over regionalism versus collective security, over trusteeships; which marked the San Francisco negotiations, are a hopeful portent of the scope of discussion that may be expected to develop in the General Assembly once the United Nations organization gets into full swing.

The Charter, moreover, in contrast to the Dumbarton Oaks document, provides that the Secretary General is to furnish information concerning the activities and decisions of the Security Council to the General Assembly, which shall be empowered to approve or disapprove, make recommendations and observations, and submit recommendations to the Security Council "with a view to insuring complete observance of the duties of the Security Council inherent in its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security." The General Assembly is thus

given a role corresponding, in international affairs, to that of a national legislature in a democratic country, which has the right to initiate measures of its own as well as to scrutinize the actions and policies of the executive.

NEW ROLE FOR ECONOMIC COUNCIL. Third, the Economic and Social Council, which had been hastily included in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as a sort of appendage to the General Assembly, has been made one of the "principal organs" of the organization. This is particularly important because the Economic and Social Council is to be composed of eighteen members elected by the General Assembly, without any reference to whether they are great or small powers, and in that sense will be a more democratic organ than the Security Council. The scope of its functions has also been greatly broadened, thanks to a number of proposals, the most interesting and elaborate of which was submitted by Canada. True, the Economic and Social Council has powers of recommendation only, and will have to act through technical agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNRRA, and others that would be brought into relationship with the United Nations organization. But if the United Nations so desire, this Council could become a powerful instrumentality for dealing with the multifarious economic and social problems cutting across boundary lines which the war has left in its wake and which, if not alleviated, bear within them the seeds of another war.

TRUSTEESHIP CHAPTER ADDED. Fourth, the Charter contains an entirely new chapter on trusteeships for dependent peoples—a subject not mentioned in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. This chapter was originally prepared by the United States, primarily to reconcile this country's desire, on security grounds, to control the Japanese mandated islands with its Atlantic Charter pledge not to aggrandize its territory. It had been hoped to hold a conference of colonial powers on the eve of the San Francisco meeting, but the death of President Roosevelt and other developments prevented fulfilment of this plan. The trusteeship proposals of the United States, although couched in general terms, were designed to meet the situation not of all colonies, but of the Pacific islands, which for the most part have few or no inhabitants, and therefore do not raise the usual problems of Western rule over native peoples. The chapter on trusteeships finally incorporated into the Charter establishes a trusteeship system for certain categories of territories, notably territories taken from enemy states, and distinguishes, in accordance with a formula proposed by the United States, between strategic areas, to be supervised by the Security Council, and non-strategic areas to be supervised by the General Assembly through a Trus-

teeship Council. The only important reference made to existing colonies is a declaration applicable to all colonial territories, whether placed under trusteeship or not, to the effect that states which have responsibility for territories inhabited by dependent peoples "accept the general principle that it is a sacred trust of civilization to promote to the utmost the wellbeing of the inhabitants of these territories within the world community." By giving the Trusteeship Council the right to investigate conditions in territories placed under its supervision, the Charter goes beyond the League Covenant. In other respects, however, it may prove less broad, since countries which, at subsequent peace conferences, receive former enemy territories, are not automatically bound to place them under the Trusteeship Council—in contrast to 1919 when countries which received mandates over former German or Turkish territories had to administer them under the supervision of the League Mandates Commission.

REGIONAL SECURITY MEASURES CLARI-FIED. Finally, the Charter clarifies the relationship between regional and collective security which had been left relatively obscure in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and had been further confused by the existence of bilateral security agreements, like the Franco-Russian alliance, and regional security pacts, notably the Act of Chapultepec concluded in March at the Mexico City Conference. Under the Charter security agreements directed against former enemy states (this would include the pacts signed by Russia with Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia) can be used "against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of such states" during a transitional period, "until such time as the [United Nations] organization may, on request of the governments concerned, be charged with the respon-

FOR JULY 15 publication—

THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE by Vera Micheles Dean

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(For the first five weeks of the Conference, Mrs. Dean attended as an accredited press representative.)

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A clear, brief survey of the Charter for International Organization drawn up at San Francisco. Cuts through a mass of technical information. This Foreign Policy Report includes text of the Charter.

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sibility for preventing further aggression by a state now at war with the United Nations." To reassure the Latin American countries that the Act of Chapultepec would not be left out of the picture, the Charter also states than nothing in its terms "impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member state, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." These two formulas, necessarily complex because of the complex situations they sought to cover, may lead to controversies in the future. The important thing, however, is that the primacy of collective, over regional and bilateral, security arrangements has been recognized.


The Charter is not intended to be a rigid, unilateral document. The United Nations will have an opportunity to review their San Francisco work at the end of ten years—a period during which, it is hoped, the world will have achieved a measure of stability and recovery. A general conference of the United Nations can then be summoned by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, with the concurrence of any seven members of the Security Council, thus removing the danger that the Big Five might veto an amendment convention. Any alterations of the Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference, like the Charter itself, shall take effect when ratified by the Big Five and by a majority of the other member states.

Now that the arduous labors of San Francisco are over, the labors of ratifying the Charter beginfirst of all in Washington. President Truman is anxious to have the United States ratify the Charter first and thus give the world assurance that this time we will collaborate with other nations not only in war, but also in peace. Seldom have relations between the President and Congress been so harmonious and understanding, and while this situation lasts Mr. Truman may well succeed in his undertaking. Even if it should prove impossible for the Senate to ratify the Charter by July 15, in time for the Big Three meeting in Berlin, the public should support the President's request that the Senate remain in session until it has ratified the document—backed by political leaders of both parties on a non-partisan basis—which creates the structure of the United Nations organization.

VERA MICHELES, DEAN

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Washington News Letter



POLISH ACCORD REVEALS EFFICACY OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN EUROPE

The agreement reached on June 22 among American, British and Russian government representatives on the establishment of a new Polish régime will furnish a practical test as to whether the United States has effectively advanced the free elections principle. The United States has traditionally supported this democratic principle in its relations with other nations. The authors of the Atlantic Charter said in 1941 that they "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live." President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin reaffirmed the principle last February in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, which aimed at "the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people."

POLISH SETTLEMENT ESSENTIAL UNITY. The understanding on Poland should encourage Americans to abandon recent doubts about the wisdom of this country's intervention in European affairs. Disagreement over Poland has disturbed relations between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States and Britain, on the other, since April 26, 1943, when the Kremlin severed relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London, which the other allies continued to recognize. At the Yalta Conference Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed to resolve the issue by establishing a commission that would reorganize the provisional Polish régime in Warsaw, recognized by Moscow, "on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." The commission met so many obstacles in the course of its negotiations that the United States only two months ago began to think a solution was almost impossible. However, the patience, determination and diplomatic skill of Harry Hopkins, whom President Truman sent to Moscow in May, brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion with the creation of a provisional Polish government of national unity along the lines set forth in the Yalta agreement.

This assertion of American interest in a European problem was an experimental diplomatic venture into the heart of a continent whose activities we have tended to criticize in the past without ourselves assuming any responsibility. Poland posed a dilemma for Roosevelt when he went to the Crimea. He could either accept the Warsaw régime—the course fav-

ored by Moscow—and thereby turn American public opinion against Russia, or he could press Marshal Stalin for a change in that régime and thereby run the risk of widening the gulf between the Soviet and American governments, at a time when he was bending every effort to bring them closer together. He chose to press upon Stalin the principle of free elections, in the Western sense, which the Soviet Union, at least in its internal affairs, does not regard as an essential part of the democratic process.

The Crimea Declaration on Poland provided that the government of national unity should "be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot." Full realization of this pledge in Poland might alter the nature of the Soviet Union's influence in Eastern Europe, where governments today look for leadership exclusively to Russia. For whereas the Polish government established by the recent agreement in Moscow is but a revised version of the Warsaw régime originally sponsored by the Soviet government, a régime established on the basis of free elections might display nationalistic independence. The United States and Britain are withholding official recognition of the interim government of national unity until it has fixed a date for elections.

OTHER QUESTIONS FOR U.S. IN EUROPE. Many problems remain in Europe to challenge the. diplomatic skill of the United States. For one thing, Washington is considering whether to propose intervention in Belgium, where the determination of King Leopold III to resume his throne in the face of strong popular opposition might create an internal political crisis. In addition to obtaining acceptance of the principle of free elections by other countries, the United States may have to decide whether it should check on the conduct of elections to determine if they are honestly held. And, if extremist groups should win most European elections, the United States may be urged by some groups here to abandon that complete neutrality regarding the outcome of elections which Secretary of State Stettinius enunciated last December 7 about Greece, when he said: "Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a government of the right or left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them." BLAIR BOLLES.

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